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JUSTICE ON APPEAL-ONE WAY OR MANY? 
Michael E. Smith* 
After two centuries of our nation's existence, discussions offederalism 
are certain to sound familiar. The ground of argument has been worked so 
thoroughly, there is hardly a patch left unturned. Conventional watch-
words suggest the competing interests: adaptability to local cir-
cumstances contrasted with efficiencies of scale, circumscribed ex-
perimentation contrasted with prevention of forum-shopping, lo.cal self-
government contrasted with the cosmopolitan perspective. 1 The most 
that can be done now, absent exceptional insight, is to display these 
choices in a fresh context. 
What follows is yet another variation on the theme. It concerns the 
propriety, perhaps the desirability, of diversity among the federal courts 
of appeals in the procedural means by which they dispose of their 
caseloads. 2 These internal procedures include, for example, the number 
of cases calendared for each judge, the extent to which oral argument is 
granted, nonpublication of opinions, and use of court staff. The problem 
dealt with here is the extent to which these procedures should be uniform 
throughout the circuit courts. 
This problem is not usually thought ofas a matter of federalism, which 
ordinarily refers to relations between the federal government and the 
states or among the states, rather than to relations among regional units 
within the federal government. Yet the value choices, if not the constitu-
tional scruples, are similar. Moreover: as centralization increases, re-
gionalism within the federal government may replace in importance the 
more familiar problem of federal-state relations. 
Strong forces are pressing toward homogenization of the internal pro-
cedures of the federal courts of appeals. Although part of this thrust may 
be aimed at uniformity in itself, it seems mostly to be a response to the 
common assumption that for every problem there is a universal solution. 
While working for the District of Columbia Circuit Court, I observed 
some of these pressures toward uniformity at close quarters. A sample 
follows. 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. B.A., 1956, Haverford College; 
M.A., 1963, Harvard University; J.D., 1964, University of Michigan. In 1976-77 the author 
was Chief Staff Counsel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. He is currently working on a history of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, 1891-1953. The author's remarks are based substantially on these experi-
ences. 
1 For a useful elaboration of the customary contentions, see G. BENSON, THE NEw 
CENTRALIZATION 9-21 (1941). The vintage of this work supports my point. 
2 Much of what I have to say applies also to state appellate courts, but they are not my 
principal concern. 
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(l) Congress may be edging toward informal national standards for the 
circuit courts. In early 1977, the chief counsel of the Senate subcommittee 
concerned with additional federal judgeships closely questioned Chief 
Judge David L. Bazel on of the District of Columbia Circuit concerning his 
court's failure to achieve par in such statistics as the number of opinions 
produced by each judge and the proportion of cases decided without oral 
argument. 3 
(2) The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate Sys-
tem, popularly known as the Hruska Commission, sought to reform the 
internal procedures of the circuit courts, in addition to its well publicized 
proposal for a National Court of Appeals. Its recommendations con-
cerned, in particular, denial of oral argument, nonpublication of opinions, 
and the functions of court staff. 4 
(3) The legal profession has joined the campaign. The American Bar 
Association last year endorsed standards covering a wide range of in-
ternal procedures of appellate courts. 5 
(4) Increasingly, academic writers are also offering procedural advice to 
the federal courts of appeals. In my view, the finest product of this 
development thus far is the focus of this symposium, Justice on Appeal by 
Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg. The authors provide 
practical and humane proposals on such subjects as the granting of oral 
argument, preparation and publication of opinions, central staff, expedit-
ing of criminal appeals, appointment of counsel, appropriate caseloads 
per judge, and specialized case assignments.6 
(5) There are pressures for uniformity even within the judicial branch. 
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, for example, 
recently submitted a report to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States that conceives of staff counsel primarily as pro se clerks and makes 
recommendations tending to fix them in that mold. 7 
I do not mean to suggest that these pressures on the federal courts of 
appeals are necessarily misguided. On the contrary, some of the propos-
als, in my view, are highly desirable as general propositions. The ques-
tion, however, is whether they ought to be impressed on all of the circuit 
courts. 
The strength of political pressures toward uniformity should not be 
exaggerated. As in all groups, there are also strong forces operating 
among the judges that encourage them to continue doing business in their 
3 Hearings on S. I I & S. 460 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 648-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as /977 Hearings]. 
4 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYS-
TEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 46-54 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
5 ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION;STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO APPELLATE COURTS: APPROVED DRAFT (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA STAND-
ARDS]. See notes 20-23, 30 and accompanying text infra. 
6 The proposals are summarized in P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 225-3) (1976). 
7 DIVISION OF PERSONNEL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS. SURVEY OF COURT LAW CLERK AND "CAREER" LAW CLERK POSITIONS (1977). 
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own ways. The influences I have observed included the following: a 
salutary preoccupation with deciding cases, at the expense of concern for 
procedural reform; reasoned commitment to present procedures or objec-
tions to the alternatives offered; wariness of what may be regarded as 
improper outside dictation; insulation from face-to-face criticism by the 
bar and public;8 and of course reluctance to endure the toil and disloca-
tions of change. The judges are encouraged in these tendencies, on 
specific issues, by public officials, practitioners, or professors who may 
be satisfied with things as they are or unable to agree on a change. 9 
I also readily acknowledge that the pressure on the federal courts of 
appeals to adopt specified internal procedures is to some extent justified. 
In fiscal year 1976, the median time in the circuit courts from filing of the 
complete record to disposition of a case argued or submitted on briefs was 
over seven months, and in the slowest court it was nearly a year. 10 
Moreover, the prognosis is not propitious. In 1968, with ninety-seven 
authorized circuit judges, there were 9, 116 cases filed in the federal courts 
of appeals; in 1976, with exactly the same number of authorized judge-
ships, 18,408 cases were filed. 11 Even if all thirty-seven of the requested 
new circuit court positions12 are provided by Congress, the ratio will still 
be markedly less favorable than a decade ago for the prompt handling of 
business. Further, informed observers sense that the average appeal is 
becoming increasingly onerous. Congress has fostered a growing number 
of lawsuits involving intricate technical issues, usually accompanied by 
ponderous administrative records, to be decided without meaningful stat-
utory guidelines. 13 The judges have also brought burdens on themselves 
by proving to be hospitable to claims raising inscrutable social issues. 14 
Revision of internal procedures is not the only way, or even the most 
important way, of responding to this predicament. The alternatives in-
8 In the words of a remarlcablejurist, "It's hard not to get the feeling that your ass is the 
divinity if it's been gettin' kissed for twenty years." Quoted in D. JACKSON, JUDGES 108 
(1974). 
9 E.g., on denial of oral argument, compare 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 649-50, with 
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 16-24; on nonpublication 
of opinions, compare COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 49-53, with P. 
CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 35-41. 
lO DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MAN· 
AGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 1976, at 12-13 (1976). 
11 Id. at 13; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1976 SEMI· 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR I (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 REPORT]. 
12 Including those requested if the Fifth Circuit were split; see 1977 Hearings, supra note 
3, at 572, 612. 
13 Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 432, 436 (1976); McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1588 
(1976); Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate 
System: First Phase 83-85 (1973) (Statement of Judge J. S. Wright). The ultimate (it is to be 
hoped) was reached in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
14 E.g., National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 956-66 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (divestiture of local newspaper-broadcast combinations required unless cross-
ownership clearly shown to be in public interest), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977); Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 111 (1977) 
(prohibition against ex parte contacts with administrative agencies extended to informal 
rulemaking proceedings). 
SPRING 1978] Justice on Appeal 339 
elude: appointing numerous additional judges, coupled with the creation 
of new appellate tribunals; 15 restricting the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, either by shifting cases to other forums or by eliminating causes of 
action altogether;16 and perhaps even doing nothing, to the point where 
litigants tire of waiting and go elsewhere to resolve their disputes.17 
Yet in actuality, and for good reasons, a sweeping response to the 
problem is unlikely. Rather, the probable result will be amelioration 
through a variety of devices, including the adjustment of internal court 
procedures. In these circumstances, pressure may be appropriate to in-
duce the judges and others to consider and agree on procedural change. 
There is a quite different consideration that points to the same conclu-
sion. Despite their general resistance to change, on certain matters the 
circuit judges may be too ready to adopt dubious innovations. 18 In my 
experience, these tend, naturally enough, to be ones that offer the judges 
relief from unpleasant burdens without obvious diminution of their 
power. The best response to this propensity may not be to resist uniform-
ity altogether, but to urge sound proposals in place of doubtful ones. 19 
Having conceded that stout forces will inevitably resist undue judicial 
regimentation, and that there are good reasons for urging that the single 
best solution to a problem be adopted by all of the circuit courts, I 
nevertheless believe that observers wrongly lose sight of the extent to 
which diversity of internal procedures among the circuit courts is proper, 
indeed perhaps desirable. I leave to others the invocation of relatively 
speculativejustifications, such as the values of circumscribed experimen-
tation or local self-government. My reasons are based on concrete dif-
ferences iri situation among the federal courts of appeals. 
The most obvious differences are in external circumstances: the size 
and character of caseloads; the extent to which circuit judges, lawyers, 
and district courts are geographically dispersed; the quality of the bar 
within the circuits; and similar factors. Examples will indicate the possi-
ble effect of these differences on a court's internal procedures. 
( 1) The American Bar Association has recommended that at the outset 
of an appeal the parties file statements providing basic information about 
the case;20 an earlier proposal would have required inclusion of a sum-
mary of facts, questions presented, and principal authorities. 21 Since such 
preliminary statements may entail considerably more paperwork for 
lawyers, and especially for court staffs, there should be a substantial 
justification for the requirement. In the Tenth Circuit Court, which has 
15 See; e.g .• COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 4, at 5-39, 55-60. 
16 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973). 
17 Casper & Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 
348 (1974). 
18 E.g., proposals that opinions not be published. For a staunch defense of nonpublica-
tion, see Frank, Remarks Before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, 16 JUDGES' J. 10 
(1977). 
19 Represented, in my view, by P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra 
note 6, at 35-41, in preference to Frank, supra note 18. 
20 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 31, 35-36. 
21 ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO APPELLATE COURTS: TENTATIVE DRAFT, 35-36 (1976). 
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required them for years with apparent satisfaction, I am told that their 
main function is to expose jurisdictional flaws promptly, such as failure of 
the district court to enter a "separate" judgment.22 This may be a suffi-
cient justification in a circuit with inattentive lawyers or with district 
courts too numerous and dispersed to be readily supervised. In a compact 
circuit with a punctilious bar and judiciary, however, preliminary state-
ments must be justified, if at all, on different grounds. 
(2) As mentioned above, the chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee 
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery has begun to encourage the 
federal courts of appeals to emulate the practices of the most productive 
circuits. 23 Likewise, the authors of Justice on Appeal advise that each 
circuit judge should participate in deciding 225 contested cases per year. 24 
Neither of these propositions makes sense unless the weight of individual 
cases is alike from court to court. While there is yet no systematic and 
reliable evidence on this point, the Federal Judicial Center has uncovered 
some useful clues. In a survey of three circuit courts several years ago, 
criminal and prisoner appeals and original proceedings were rated as the 
least time-consuming, while antitrust appeals and petitions from adminis-
trative agencies other than the NLRB were considered the most burden-
some. 25 Not surprisingly, the caseload of the "most productive" circuit 
court in fiscal year 1976 consisted of forty-six percent criminal, prisoner, 
and original cases, but only nine percent antitrust and non-NLRB ad-
ministrative cases. By contrast, the caseload of the "least productive" 
court was composed of only seventeen percent of the lightest kinds of 
cases and forty-five percent of the heaviest kinds. 26 Differences between 
the two courts in the number of cases decided without oral argument may 
also be partially explained in the same way. 27 
(3) The authors of Justice on Appeal urge courts to publish all opinions, 
a characteristically decent and workable proposal as they expound it. 28 
Assuming, however, that certain courts will continue not to publish their 
least significant opinions, the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice 
supports the customary rule that these opinions not be cited as prece-
dent. 29 The American Bar Association, on the. other hand, would allow 
citation provided that adequate notice is given to the court and opposing 
parties. 30 In my view, neither alternative need prevail in all circuits. The 
22 FED. R. C1v. P. 58. 
23 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 648-49. 
24 P. CARRINGTON, 0. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 196-97, 142-46. 
25 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, APPELLATE COURTS CASEWEIGHT PROJECT 11-13 (1977). 
The survey also suggests that even within the same category of cases, some circuit courts 
hear more onerous appeals than others. 
26 1976 REPORT, supra note II, at 3, 64-66. The "most productive" and "least product-
ive" courts were identified according to appeals terminated per judge, taking into account 
the contribution by senior and visiting judges. The case statistics are for the first half of 1976, 
the most recent detailed data available. 
27 1977 Hearings, supra note 3, at 649-50. 
28 P. CARRINGTON, 0. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 35-41. 
29 5 ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 129 
(1975). 
30 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 63-65. 
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rationale behind the no-citation rule is that only local or large-scale 
litigants can keep up with unpublished opinions; insofar as these opinions 
are favorable, the ability to cite to them provides an unfair advantage. 31 
Like the justification for preliminary statements, this may make sufficient 
sense in a farflung circuit. It makes much less sense in a compact circuit 
where nearly all lawyers are local, of which the District of Columbia is the 
extreme instance. 
(4) A federal statute provides that when petitions from the same adminis-
trative order are filed in several circuit courts, the court of first filing shall 
hear all of the cases, unless it considers another court to be more conven-
ient. 32 At times, this statute has prompted split second races to the 
courthouse. For example, after a recent FPC proceeding resulted in 
vastly increased natural gas rates, petitions to review the final order were 
filed virtually simultaneously by consumers in the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court and by producers in the Fifth Circuit Court. 33 Representa-
tive John E. Moss, a consumer advocate, later charged that lawyers for 
the producers, filing at the New Orleans courthouse, had been given an 
office and phone of their own and the undivided attention of a deputy 
clerk, while lawyers for the consumers in Washington had to wait in line 
at the counter of the clerk's office and use a public phone in another part 
of the building. 34 On its face this is a rousing tale of favoritism contrasted 
with regularity, but in fact the difference in treatment may simply reflect 
different physical circumstances between the two courts. A court with a 
relatively small caseload, and therefore a small clerk's office and staff, 
but within easy reach of most lawyers practicing before the court, is likely 
to be a bustling place where personal accommodations for the clientele 
are not feasible. In a court with a huge caseload, and facilities and staff to 
match, but with few lawyers in the vicinity, personal assistance to all 
customers can be offered as a matter of course.35 
Less obvious than external differences among the circuit courts, but at 
least as significant, are variations among the propensities and institutional 
traditions of the judges. Admittedly; many of these differences are of no 
value, and some ought to be suppressed. Others, however, manifest 
diverse gifts for expressing the same spirit of justice. Insofar as this is so, 
I believe that courts ought to safeguard their special talents, rather than 
squander them in attempts to conform to a common ideal. Such attempts 
may well fail, leaving the courts bereft of all excellence. 
The following examples should not be regarded as an effort to argue the 
question: what constitutes good judging. They are merely meant to illus-
trate my general contention that some of the differences in the internal 
31 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 36. 
32 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1970). 
33 American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
34 Letter from John E. Moss to Harley 0. Staggers (Nov. 10, 1976); Anderson & Whitten, 
A Multibil/ion-Dollar Oil-Gas Caper, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1976, D.C. 13, col. 4. 
3
• By allotting personnel to clerks' offices almost wholly on the basis of the number of 
cases filed, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts commits the very error of 
which I am warning. 
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character of the circuit courts are appropriate, if not desirable. To this 
extent, the internal procedures of each court should take account of, and 
capitalize on, its particular qualities. 
( 1) Some admirable judges are highly reflective. They take a long time 
to decide a case, researching each issue thoroughly and thinking it 
through as deeply as possible. Their opinions are exhaustive; they pursue 
all points raised and justify each of their conclusions in detail. Moreover, 
they carefully scrutinize the opinions of their colleagues, giving ample 
advice and insisting on speaking for themselves when not fully satisfied 
with the majority's reasoning. 36 Other equally admirable judges are much 
more practical. They plunge into a case, arrive at a prompt conclusion, 
and go on to their next task. They are tolerant of the work of other judges, 
neither giving private advice nor expressing their disagreements publicly, 
except in unusual instances. Their opinions are terse; they focus on the 
major issues raised; and their primary aim is to articulate the holding 
clearly rather than to justify it. 37 
Courts may be composed of judges of both kinds, but insofar as one or 
the other predominates these differences suggest procedural consequen-
ces. A court of the former type should not feel as obliged as the latter to 
dispose of as many cases for each judge, to dispense with oral argument 
or decide cases by brief memorandum opinions, or to grant rehearing only 
very grudgingly. It has a greater need for a host of law clerks. 
(2) Good judges may properly hold strong views of what is socially 
right; this was true of two of our great Chief Justices, John Marshall and 
Earl Warren. In a circuit court composed predominantly of such judges, 
especially if appointed by different Presidents, the members are apt to 
disagree sharply with each other. 38 On the other hand, fine judges, such 
as Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, may be relatively detached, 
except perhaps in their commitment to disinterested judging. The ten-
dency of such a court, by contrast, will be to minimize controversy. 39 
The former type of circuit court may need procedural mechanisms that 
are inappropriate for the latter, such as: assigning cases to panels almost 
wholly by lot, rather than steering related cases to the same panel; 
disposition of debatable procedural motions by full panels, rather than by 
a single judge or the court staff; and resort to en bane hearings in the 
relatively large number of cases over which the court is irrevocably 
divided. 
I realize that some circuit courts may not be gifted at all. I also 
acknowledge that my plea for diversity of internal procedures can be 
abused; it can become an excuse for circuit judges who decline to restrain 
36 E.g., Justice Frankfurter and several current judges of the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court. 
37 E.g., three outstanding former judges of the Second Circuit Court-Charles M. Hough, 
Thomas W. Swan, and Augustus N. Hand. 
38 E.g., the District of Columbia Circuit Court, intermittently during the past 25 years. 
39 E.g., the Second Circuit Court during the 1930's. 
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themselves in the public interest. In such circumstances, they may have 
to be admonished or regulated according to uniform standards. 
The propriety of diversity of internal procedures among the federal 
courts of appeals can thus be expressed in terms of recurring and conflict-
ing cliches of federalism, primarily the tension between adaptability to 
local circumstances and avoidance of self-centered parochialism. Here, 
as elsewhere, wisdom may consist of knowing which cliche to invoke at 
the proper time. 
As a rule of thumb, however, I encourage observers to err in favor of 
tolerating diversity. Uniform national standards should not be promoted 
unless clear matters of principle are involved or the conditions in each 
circuit are thoroughly appreciated. Even then, the possibility that certain 
local needs and values may have gone unnoticed suggests that the stand-
ards ought to allow considerable leeway. This approach may counteract 
the tendency to suppose that there is a universal solution to every prob-
lem. More importantly, it may assure scope for the disciplined exercise of 
individual judicial gifts, the most important ingredient of justice on ap-
peal. 
